Georgia State University College of Law

Reading Room
Faculty Publications By Year

Faculty Publications

6-2017

Reflection: How Multiracial Lives Matter 50 Years
After Loving
Lauren Sudeall Lucas
Georgia State University College of Law, lslucas@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Family
Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law and Society
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
Recommended Citation
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reflection: How Multiracial Lives Matter 50 Years After Loving, 50 Creighton L. Rev. 719 (2017).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

719

REFLECTION: HOW MULTIRACIAL LIVES
MATTER 50 YEARS AFTER LOVING
LAUREN SUDEALL LUCAS†
Black Lives Matter. All Lives Matter. These two statements are
both true, but connote very different sentiments in our current political reality. To further complicate matters, in this short reflection
piece, I query how multiracial lives matter in the context of this
heated social and political discussion about race. As a multiracial person committed to racial justice and sympathetic both to those pushing
for recognition of multiracial identity and to those who worry such recognition may undermine larger movements, these are questions I have
long grappled with both professionally and personally. Of course,
multiracial lives matter—but do they constitute a sub-agenda of the
Black Lives Matter movement, or is there an independent agenda the
moniker “Multiracial Lives Matter” might represent? If the latter, is
there a danger that such an agenda might be co-opted by other forces
and used to further unintended purposes, such as the advancement of
colorblindness?1 To the extent that agenda demands unique recognition of multiracial identity, how can it co-exist with broader identitybased racial justice movements?
In the political realm, multiracial individuals have the potential
to operate as chameleons—negotiating the divide between ever-more
polarized views on race. This is not only because they may fall somewhere in the middle of the color spectrum, but because they are often
forced to personally navigate this terrain throughout their lives.
Many multiracial individuals know intimately what it means to be oppressed on the basis of race but also placed above others in the racial
hierarchy.2 In a world where darkness often represents greater danger,3 many multiracial individuals are simply less threatening. Under
this view, President Obama’s rise to power represents not the dawn† Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
1. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Undoing Race? Reconciling Multiracial Identity
with Equal Protection, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1260-61 (2014) (describing the uneasy
alliance between multiracial advocacy groups and conservative politicians, who believed
creation of a multiracial category on the census would be a step toward the “elimination
of racial and ethnic categories” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 1, at 1270 (describing study showing that multiracial students experience less discrimination than monoracial minority students, but
more discrimination than white students).
3. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt, P.G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns &
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI., 383, 383 (2006).
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ing of a post-racial era, but instead evidence of the fact that many
multiracial individuals have an easier time navigating the politics of
race in America.
With few exceptions,4 however, the issue of multiracial identity
has been largely absent from recent discussions of identity politics.
And perhaps for some, that is a necessary or intentional maneuver.
One might fear that multiracial identity’s fluidity,5 its evolving views
of race (often minimizing its relevance or influence),6 and its growing
influence (particularly among younger generations)7 might be used to
undermine larger identity-based movements. Thus, it is critical to understand the role that identity plays in those movements—and when
it is structural rather than personal, or externally rather than internally driven. For example, “Black Lives Matter” might be viewed not
primarily as a reflection of the community defining blackness, and
who falls in or out of that category, but as a statement regarding the
way in which external forces have defined and systematically devalued blackness of all shades (including those of multiracial individuals). Thus, it is not necessarily hostile to the individual’s desire to
conceive of her own racial identity, but it does deem that conception
irrelevant to how society distributes benefits or burdens based on
race.
The underlying fear of some racial justice advocates is that the
brand of individualism typified by those pushing for a distinct multiracial identity8 will destroy any sense of collective identity, a critical
element of many social movements. Individualism has played a
strong role in the Supreme Court’s race jurisprudence—embodied by
Justice O’Connor’s oft-cited declaration in Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena9 that the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments “protect persons, not groups.”10 Another domi4. See, e.g., Moises Velasquez-Manoff, What Biracial People Know, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 4. 2017), https://nyti.ms/2lr2DOR.
5. See Lucas, supra note 1, at 1246 (“Through the lens of multiracial identity . . . race is a fluid and socially constructed concept, capable of changing over time
and assuming many different forms.”); id. at 1263-64 (highlighting the “multiplicity”
(manifesting in different ways) and “fluidity” (change over time) of multiracial identity).
6. Id. at 1263-71 (describing how multiracials conceive of their racial identity and
of race more broadly, including the fact that they “are more likely to view race as a
social construct” and less likely to perceive race-based discrimination or to express opposition to symbolic racism).
7. Id. at 1255-59 (noting changes in population demographics and the growing
group of individuals who identify as mixed-race); id. at 1266 (noting that younger people
are more likely to categorize themselves as multiracial).
8. Id. at 1270 (noting social science studies demonstrating that “mixed-race individuals tend to be more individualistic and disengaged with regard to issues of race”).
9. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
10. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis in
original).
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nant force in the Court’s recent racial discrimination cases is the anticlassification approach toward equal protection, which mandates that
race-based distinctions should always be discouraged, regardless of
whether such distinctions are invidious or benign.11 Chief Justice
John Roberts’s opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 112 epitomizes this view. There, the Chief
Justice famously declared: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”13 In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts relied on the landmark case, Brown v.
Board of Education14 to declare unconstitutional two voluntary school
assignment plans adopted by Seattle and Louisville to maintain or increase racial diversity among their schools.15 Many of the dissenting
justices viewed the majority opinion’s reasoning as a distortion of
Brown.16 Underlying their response is a decades-long debate about
whether to interpret cases like Brown—or Loving v. Virginia,17 the
focus of this Symposium—to discourage any consideration of race
(often tied to notions of individualism18) or only those uses of race that
serve to subordinate or oppress certain racial groups. In my view, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Loving was not only about eliminating
distinctions based on race, but also those measures clearly designed to
11. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 222-27 (holding that the same level of scrutiny applies to both “invidious” and “benign” racial classifications).
12. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
13. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007). In contrast, Justice Sonia Sotomayor used similar language in a more recent
case to offer a very different view of how the Court might most effectively address racial
discrimination. See Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and
Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct.
1623, 1676 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the
Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination. As members of the judiciary tasked with intervening to carry out the guarantee of
equal protection, we ought not sit back and wish away, rather than confront, the racial
inequality that exists in our society. It is this view that works harm, by perpetuating
the facile notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the simple truth that
race does matter.”).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
15. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 709-11, 746-48.
16. See id. at 798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that there was a “cruel irony”
in the Chief Justice’s reliance on Brown and that the opinion “rewrites the history of one
of this Court’s most important decisions.”).
17. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
18. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271, 275 (2003) (holding University
of Michigan’s affirmative action policy unconstitutional and emphasizing the importance of individualized consideration in the admissions process); Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978) (invalidating admissions program of University
of California at Davis Medical School based on its use of race and highlighting the importance of treating “each applicant as an individual in the admissions process.”).
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maintain racial hierarchy.19 Thus, we should understand Loving not
as a harbinger of a colorblind society where race is irrelevant, but as a
bulwark against uses of race that aim to disparage racial groups or
maintain a specific racial order.
Race plays an important organizing function in society, and one
over which we have little control as individuals; this can be difficult to
reconcile with the self-determination many multiracial individuals
possess to control their own racial identity and how it is perceived by
others. While some are dismissive of that premise, instead favoring a
racial solidarity approach that minimizes the relevance of subcategories, I have contended that it is important to allow multiracial individuals to define their own identity.20 This is a sentiment that has been
echoed by Justice Kennedy’s language in several recent opinions discussing racial identity (if not addressing multiracial identity directly).21 Yet this sentiment need not necessarily be at odds with
broader identity-based movements. An individual can remain free to
define her own identity under the terms that she desires while simultaneously recognizing that society often does not operate under those
same terms and will more likely than not group her with individuals
who assume a different racial identity.
Before Loving, the very unions that might give rise to multiracial
children were illegal.22 In declaring anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that such laws
served legitimate state interests—including interests in “prevent[ing]
19. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“The fact that Virginia prohibits only
interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy.”). Moreover, the Loving Court flatly rejected the state’s argument that the
miscegenation statute’s “equal application” (in quotes, given that the law prohibited
whites from marrying nonwhites, but allowed nonwhites to marry any other nonwhite,
see Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 n.11) to all races could cure its unconstitutionality. See id. at
8 (“[W]e reject the notion that the mere ‘equal application’ of a statute containing racial
classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription of all invidious racial discriminations . . . .”).
20. Lucas, supra note 1, at 1267-69 (reviewing the social and psychological consequences of denying multiracial individuals the ability to identify as such).
21. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (“The Constitution
promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights
that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”);
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (noting that the liberties guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity
and beliefs.”); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“Under our Constitution the individual, child or adult, can
find his own identity, can define her own persona, without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or the color of her skin.”).
22. This sentiment is reminiscent of the rallying cry often heard in the immigration context: “No human being is illegal.”
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‘the corruption of blood’ [and] ‘a mongrel breed of citizens.’ ”23 Thus, in
some sense, the gift Loving bestows upon multiracial individuals born
of these now lawful interracial relationships is the very freedom of
being. Yet we must be mindful of the fact that the freedom to define
our own personal identity is rooted in a jurisprudence aimed at eliminating identity-based structural oppression and that identity remains
an important tool in counteracting such oppression. While the law
provides us with the freedom to define ourselves—to declare that multiracial lives also “matter”—we must not be blind to the ways in which
other, more powerful forces continue to define us and the linked fate
that exists between black and multiracial lives.

23. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7.
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